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Abstract 
 
Recent studies suggest that humans prefer information that is linked to the process of prediction. Yet it 
remains to be specified whether preference judgments are biased to information that can be predicted, 
or information that enables to predict. We here use a serial reaction time task to disentangle these two 
options. In a first learning phase, participants were exposed to a continuous stream of arbitrary shapes 
while performing a go/no-go task. Embedded in this stream were hidden pairs of go-stimuli (e.g., 
shape A was always followed by shape B). Data show faster reaction times to predictable shapes (i.e., 
shape B) as compared to random and predictive shapes (i.e., shape A), indicating that participants 
learned the regularities and anticipated upcoming information. Importantly, in a subsequent, 
unannounced forced-choice preference task, the shapes that were predictive of others were 
significantly more preferred over random shapes than shapes that could be predicted. Because both the 
reaction time benefit in the learning phase and the effect in the preference phase could be considered 
rather small, we studied the relation between both. Interestingly, the preference correlated with the 
reaction time benefit from the learning phase. A closer look at this correlation further suggested that 
the difference in preference was only observed when participants picked up the contingencies between 
predictive and predictable shapes. This study adds evidence to the idea that prediction processes are 
not only fundamental for cognition, but contribute to the way we evaluate our external world.   
 
Keywords: Affect; Predictive coding; Emotion; Uncertainty; Choice; Prediction; Preference 
Judgments 
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Introduction 
 
Which shoes would you prefer – the fancy green Mocassins, the clunky black Boots, or the 
comfortable white Sneakers?  Just walking through a footwear store makes it impossible to imagine 
that there are general rules that determine our choices and preferences. Yet, the discovery of such rules 
has been a goal of psychological science almost since its very foundation (Fechner, 1876). Over the 
past decades, researchers have identified several factors that influence our preferences and aesthetic 
judgments, such as mere exposure (Zajonc, 1980), complexity (Frith & Nias, 1974), contrast (Reber, 
Winkielmann, & Schwarz, 1996), curviness (Bar & Neta, 2006), or processing fluency (Leder, Belke, 
Oeberst, & Austin, 2004; Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004). Recently, it has been proposed that 
preference judgments are also linked to the process of prediction (Ogawa & Watanabe, 2011; Trapp, 
Shenhav, Bitzer & Bar, 2015).  
Why should the process of prediction be an influential factor to begin with? There is considerable 
evidence that the brain does not passively perceive sensory input, but actively constructs hypotheses or 
predictions that are tested against sensory input (Alink, Schwiedrzik, Kohler, Singer, & Muckli, 2010; 
Bar et al., 2006; Knill & Pouget, 2004; Rao & Ballard, 1999; Todorovic, van Ede, Maris, & de Lange, 
2011; Trapp & Bar, 2015). In other words, perception inherently requires and relies upon prior 
expectations that support the inference. It has even been suggested that the minimization of surprise is 
the major goal of the brain and accounts for a plethora of neuroanatomical and neurophysiological 
findings (Friston, 2005; 2009). Sensory information that contradicts with our current predictions will 
typically result in the sensation of surprise (e.g., Foerster, 2016; Horstmann, 2015; Schützwohl, 1998). 
To avoid surprise, an improved prediction of sensory input is mandatory, and we need to learn and use 
the statistical regularities in our environment that allow us to make correct predictions. Accordingly, 
one could assume that stimuli which are linked to the facilitation of this process receive positive 
valuation.  
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Indeed, two recent studies have supported this hypothesis. Using a visual search paradigm, Ogawa 
and Watanabe (2011) showed that humans preferred configurations of distractor stimuli that allowed 
them to predict the location of a target over configurations that did not. Similarly, Trapp and 
colleagues (2015) demonstrated how random shapes that had been presented in a fixed predictable 
context (i.e., always presented in the same group of shapes) were preferred over shapes that had been 
presented in a random context (i.e., always presented in a different group of shapes). However, in both 
studies, the predictive (i.e., the ability to predict) and predictable (i.e., the possibility to be predicted) 
aspect of the stimuli was embedded in one and the same stimulus. For example, it remains unclear 
whether participants' preference for a specific display was because it had helped them to predict the 
location of a target or because it contained the predictable location (Ogawa and Watanabe, 2011). 
Similarly, it could not be determined whether participants preferred certain shapes because the shape 
allowed them to predict the occurrence of other shapes or because the shape itself could be predicted 
based on the occurrence of other shapes (Trapp et al., 2015).  
To test this, we designed a paradigm that allows dissociating these two options. Specifically, we 
used a serial reaction time task with hidden regularities, i.e., a shape always predicted the occurrence 
of another, subsequent shape. In line with the proposal that the brain tries to minimize surprise, we 
hypothesized that participants would prefer information that supports this process over information 
that can be predicted.   
 
Method 
 
Participants. 94 students (range = 17-36 years, 68 female, 85 right-handed) took part in return for 
course credits. Participants gave informed consent prior to the study, and the procedures were 
approved by the local ethics committee of Ghent University. 
Stimuli and material. We used the same stimuli as used by Trapp, Shenhav, Bitzer & Bar (2015), 
which consisted of 64 shapes with no semantic meaning or apparent affective value. For each 
participant separately, two shapes were randomly assigned as no-go stimuli, and 32 as go-stimuli. The 
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32 go-stimuli were further randomly subdivided in eight predictive go-stimuli, eight predictable go-
stimuli, and 16 random go-stimuli. All instructions and stimuli were presented on a black background. 
Stimuli were presented on a CRT monitor located 60 cm away from the eyes using Tscope software 
(Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonk, 2006). Participants used the spacebar on a 
standard QWERTY keyboard for responding to the go-stimuli in the learning phase, and the letters F 
and J, as their left and right response key respectively, for indicating their preference in the preference 
judgment task. 
Procedure. During the instructions, participants were first presented with the two no-go shape 
stimuli and instructed to withhold response whenever one of these two stimuli was presented on 
screen, but press spacebar whenever another shape would be presented on screen. After these 
instructions, we presented 840 trials with self-paced brakes in between every 120 trials, resulting in 
seven blocks of 120 trials. Per 40 trials, each of the 32 go-stimuli was centrally presented once and 
each of the two no-go stimuli was presented four times. Importantly, the stimuli were presented in a 
random order with the following exception: a predictive go-stimulus always preceded a predictable 
stimulus. Specifically, eight pairs were formed to ensure that each specific predictive stimulus was 
always uniquely followed by one of the specific predictable go-stimuli (e.g., predictive shape A was 
always followed by predictable shape B, predictive shape C always by predictable shape D, etc.). The 
stimuli remained on screen until participants pressed spacebar or the response deadline of 1200 ms had 
passed. Next, there was a 500 ms inter-trial interval during which nothing was presented on screen, 
and after which the next stimulus appeared on screen. During breaks, participants were informed about 
the amount of response errors they made and remembered to avoid making errors as much as possible. 
After this learning task, participants were presented with a second unannounced preference 
judgment task. In this task, subjects had to indicate their preference for one out of two shape stimuli. 
The 16 random go shapes were divided in two groups of 8 shapes (i.e., r1 and r2). Next, each of the 
eight predictive shapes was presented next to one of the r1 shapes, and each of the eight predictable 
shapes were presented next to one of the r2 shapes. These 16 pairs were presented in a random order, 
after which another 16 comparisons were made by pairing each of the predictive and predictable 
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stimuli with a shape from the alternative random group. In fact, for each specific predictive-
predictable stimulus pair (i.e., shape A was always followed by B), both shapes were compared to the 
same random stimuli across all 32 trials (i.e., if A was compared to random shape X and B to Y in the 
first 16 trials, A would be compared to Y and B to X in one of the next 16 trials). This way, the 
predictive and predictable stimuli were compared to the same baseline. 
Finally, in the first 49 subjects, we also collected two post-interview questions from the 
participants to assess awareness of contingencies. First, they were asked whether they noticed 
something about the order in which the stimuli were presented. Thereafter, they were told that some 
participants were assigned to a group with a random order condition, while other participants were 
assigned to a group for which there was something programmed in the order of stimuli. They were 
then asked to which group they thought they belonged. If they correctly answered that they belong to 
the non-random group, they were further asked which order in the sequence they noticed. Importantly, 
while 37% of the participants (n = 18) thought they might have belonged to the non-random group, 
none of the subjects reported any order effect related to the order of go-trials. If anything, the 
participants thought there might have been a pre-programmed sequence in which the no-go trials 
occurred (e.g., "the figures to which I should not react seemed to purposely repeat one another", "the 
figures to which I should not react sometimes occurred three times in a row"). These results strongly 
suggest that none of the participants were aware of the motivation for this experiment, let alone the 
comparison they were subjected to in the preference judgment task. 
 
Results 
 
All data can be found on the open science framework (https://osf.io/w2bef/). The subjects were 
recruited in two samples. A subset of the analyses was performed twice (all but the correlation 
analysis): once after a first sample of 49 subjects, and once after collecting another 45 subjects. While 
the main effects of interest (learning effect and preference effect) already reached significance after 
the first sample (both ps < .05), the sample was further increased in response to a reviewers' 
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suggestion to increase the reliability of this result. We report the uncorrected p-values, but note that 
the main results also reached significance when using a Bonferroni correction (multiplying p-values 
by two). Similarly, a mini meta-analysis (e.g., Goh, Hall, & Rosenthal, 2016) treating the two samples 
as independent experiments reached significant results. One participant was excluded from the 
analysis because (s)he responded to the preference phase using the spacebar (which was only relevant 
in the learning phase). 
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Figure 1. General paradigm and results. A. Task and procedure. The experiment consisted of a training phase 
and a subsequent, unannounced preference judgment task. In the training phase, participants had to respond to 
each shape as fast as possible, except for two previously instructed no-go shapes. Unknown to the participant, 
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some (predictive) shapes were always followed by the same (predictable) go-shape. In the preference judgment 
task, participants had to indicate their preference for one out of two shapes, of which one was always a random 
shape, and the other either a predictive or predictable shape. B. Differences between predictive and predictable 
shapes. Left. Mean reaction times for each go-shape separately: Although participants were unable to correctly 
report any contingencies, reaction times were fastest for predictable shapes, and slowest for random shapes, 
indicating that contingencies had been learned. Right. Preference judgments as a function of shape type 
(predictive versus random, predictable versus random shape). Participants preferred predictive shapes over 
random shapes more than they preferred predictable images over random shapes.  
 
Learning phase. Participants were successful in withholding their response on 76.7% (SD = 
11.3%) of the no-go trials and responded within the response deadline of 1200 ms to 99.8% (SD =.4%) 
of the go trials. Reaction times faster than 100 ms or slower than the mean plus two SDs were 
excluded from the analyses. When comparing the mean reaction times per go-shape, predictable 
shapes (352 ms) were significantly faster responded to than both random (360 ms), t(92) = 5.204, p < 
.001, or predictive shapes (361 ms), t(92) = 4.633, p < .001.Reaction times were not significantly 
different between responses to predictive shapes were versus random shapes, t(92) < 1.  
Notably, it has been observed before that people tend to slow down after having inhibited their 
response on a previous trial (e.g., Bissett & Logan, 2011), and in the present experiment only 
predictive or random shapes could follow a no-go trial. Therefore, to ensure that the present effects are 
not a side-effect of post-no-go slowing, we repeated this analysis using only predictive or random 
shape trials that followed a predictable trial. Even when using this conservative criterion, predictable 
shapes (352 ms) were still significantly faster responded to than both random (358 ms), t(92) = 2.508, 
p = .014, or predictive shapes (356 ms), t(92) = 2.867, p = .005 (see Figure 1B, left panel). 
Preference judgments. Predictive shapes were preferred over random shapes 51.4 % of the time 
and predictable shapes were preferred over (the same) random shapes in 47.7 % of the time (see 
Figure 1B, right panel). While these individual preference rates were not significantly different from 
50 %, both ps > .1, the difference between both preference rates was significant, as indicated by the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test, Z = 2.401, p = .016, effect size r = .249 (Rosenthal, 1994). 
8 
 
Correlation analysis. While we did observe a significant preference for predictive over predictable 
shapes, the effect was rather small: predictive shapes were only preferred 3.7% more than predictable 
shapes. Interestingly, however, so was the effect of learning, i.e., using predictive information to 
predict upcoming stimuli. The difference between random and predictable trials was only 6 ms, and a 
substantial number of subjects did not show any learning effect. Therefore, to determine whether the 
preference effect related to the degree to which they picked up the contingencies between predictive 
and predictable shapes, we performed a correlation analysis between this difference in preference and 
the learning effect in milliseconds (by subtracting mean reaction times on predictable shapes from 
those on random shapes). Indeed, participants showing a larger reaction time benefit in the learning 
phase, showed a larger difference in preference in the preference phase, r = .224, p = .031 (see Figure 
2). Following the reasoning that implicit learning effects are more expressed over time (Abrahamse, 
Jiménez, Verwey, & Clegg, 2010), this correlation was replicated when using only the reaction times 
from the second half of the learning phase, r = .273, p = .008, but not when using those of the first 
half, r = .111, p = .288. As can be seen on Figure 2, this correlation could potentially be driven by the 
one participant that showed a difference in preference of 56.25%. However, we note that both a 
Spearman rank-ordered correlation, which is minimally sensitive to outliers, ρ = .226, p = .030, as well 
as a correlation analysis excluding this participant, r = .250, p = .016, reached similar conclusions. 
In addition, to further determine to which extent having a learning effect (i.e., the reaction time 
benefit on predictable trials as an index of whether somebody picked up the contingency or not) 
determines the preference effect, we also re-analyzed our preference effect on the subset of 
participants that had a learning effect larger than 0 ms, and the set of participants that did not. In line 
with our above interpretation, the people that did show a learning effect larger than 0 ms (n = 53) 
showed a significant difference between their preference for predictive (45.9 %) versus predictable 
shapes (52.7 %), Z = 3.002, p < .005, effect size r = .412, whereas the other group (n = 40) did not 
(49.7 % vs. 50.0 %), Z < 1, effect size r = .028. 
Last, we wanted to study whether the above-mentioned correlation was primarily driven by an 
increased preference for predictive stimuli when having learned the regularities, or a decreased 
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preference for predictable stimuli. To this end, we ran the above-mentioned correlation analyses again, 
but, this time, for the preference for predictive stimuli and preference for predictable stimuli 
separately. This analysis hinted at a positive relation between the learning effect and a preference for 
predictive stimuli, r = .180, p = .085, while no such trend was observed for the relation between the 
learning effect and a preference for predictable stimuli, r = -.057, p = .587. In close analogy to the 
above-mentioned correlation analyses, similar results were observed when focusing on the second half 
only, r = .189, p = .070, and r = -.100, p = .341, respectively. In fact, when only focusing on the 
participants that did show a positive learning effect to begin with, this positive relation between the 
size of this learning effect and a preference for predictive stimuli was yet more prominent, r = .270, p 
= .045, while still no relation between the learning effect and a preference for predictable stimuli was 
observed, r = .073, p = .604.  
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Figure 2. Individual differences in (implicit learning) and shape preference. The learning effect (i.e., 
reaction time benefit for predictable shapes) correlated positively with the preference for predictive shapes over 
predictable shapes (upper panel). When comparing the subject that did show an effect (learning effect > 0 ms) to 
those that did not (learning effect </= 0 ms), it becomes evident that only the former group showed a difference 
in preference between both types of shapes (lower panel). 
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Discussion 
 
The proposal that the brain constantly predicts its own sensory input suggests that we may also 
value information that supports this process. Two studies indicate that human preferences are indeed 
biased towards information that is linked to predictive processing (Ogawa & Watanabe, 2011; Trapp 
et al., 2015). Here, we addressed the question whether preference is higher for information that is 
predictive or information that can be predicted. By using a serial reaction time task with hidden 
regularities that allowed the anticipation of upcoming information, we found that participants chose 
information that promoted predictions over information that could be predicted.  
As the effect was rather small, and some participants did not pick up the contingencies in our task, 
future studies may use more straightforward or explicit manipulations of predictable relations to 
demonstrate larger effects, and effects across all individuals. Another way to strengthen the current 
finding could be to prolong the learning session and/or use less fixed pairs of predictive and 
predictable shapes (e.g., four instead of eight, as used in the present study). 
The positive evaluation of information that triggers predictions aligns nicely with a framework 
which conjectures that perceptual inference incorporates expectations during the interpretation of 
sensory input (Friston, 2005; 2009; Rao & Ballard, 1999; Trapp & Bar, 2015). Another account of 
preference and aesthetic judgments suggests that humans rely on their processing experience for 
evaluation – the easier a stimulus is processed, the higher it is valued (Leder, Belke, Oeberst, & 
Austin, 2004). However, our findings here disfavor the proposal that increased processing fluency 
contributed to the preference of predictive stimuli, as these were processed slower than predicted 
stimuli, yet were more preferred. Trapp et al. (2015) already provided evidence that predictability may 
be an influential factor in the context of preference judgments. They asked participants to decide 
which of two pictures of daily objects they prefer (e.g., image of a pizza or a cactus). Importantly, 
these objects were matched for several low-level features, and were rated beforehand on the degree to 
which they elicit associations. The finding was that the amount of associations is a significant 
predictor of preference choices. However, the link to prediction in their study was rather indirect – 
associative information is assumed to promote predictions (Bar, 2007). By using a serial reaction time 
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task, we here manipulate predictive processes directly, and show a preference for information that is 
linked to the process of using predictive information, rather than to the result hereof.  
One possible limitation of the present experiment is that it cannot unequivocally establish whether 
predictable stimuli were simply preferred less because the task was subjectively experienced as boring, 
and the stimuli accordingly became associated with less excitement. We conducted correlation 
analyses that focused on both preference measures separately, and the results disfavor this account: 
Specially, participants who were more likely to pick up the relation between predictive and predictable 
stimuli showed a change in preference of the predictive stimulus, rather than a change in their 
preference of the predictable stimulus. If the effect was really driven by disfavoring predictable 
stimuli, one would expect a change in the latter as well, as putative effects of boredom would magnify 
with increasing strength of being able to predict the stimuli following the predictors. Furthermore, if 
the effects are driven by disfavoring the predictable stimuli, one would also expect less positive 
evaluation of predictors, as those are associated with and announce the putatively less exciting event. 
A more direct way to address this issue in follow-up studies could be to employ stimulus ratings where 
each stimulus type (predictive, predictable, and random) is rated independently (if possible, both 
before and after the learning phase). 
Our study also points towards the importance of taking into account individual differences. 
Specifically, the present data showed that only some participants were able to pick up the 
contingencies, suggesting that the present paradigm was not successful in triggering contingency 
learning in each and every participant. However, by taking into account these individual differences, 
we were able to demonstrate that size of this implicit learning effect showed a positive relation with 
the preference for predictive stimuli over predictable stimuli, further supporting our main hypothesis. 
Usually, serial reaction time tasks and studies investigating behavioral and neural correlates of 
predictions and prediction errors only report group averages, but it can also be an exciting avenue to 
investigate whether and why inter-individual differences in these low-level implicit learning exist (see 
also Kaufman et al., 2010). One step further, individual differences in preferences for predictable or 
predictive information may help us in understanding different traits, or potentially even certain clinical 
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disorders that are linked to predictive processes (e.g., see Goris, Deschrijver, Trapp, Brass, & Braem, 
2017).  
Another exciting aspect that can be addressed in follow-up studies relates to the fact that both the 
predictive and predictable stimuli were associated to a task-relevant action (i.e., pressing the spacebar 
as fast as possible). It remains to be tested whether similar changes in preference could be observed for 
relations that are not tied to specific actions, or that are not task relevant at all. If so, this could suggest 
that the affective tagging of predictive stimuli is inherent to the way we process any type of 
information, irrespective of their goal or task relevance. 
Taken together, this study supports the idea that the rather neglected dimension of valence is 
important in the context of a ‘predictive brain’ (Chetverikov & Kristjánsson, 2016; Feldman-Barrett & 
Bar, 2009; Schäfer, Overy, & Nelson, 2013; Trapp et al., 2015). Future studies should address how 
these and related findings resonate with the idea that humans can also prefer and seek out uncertain, 
novel and surprising events (Berlyne, 1971; Van de Cruys & Wagemans, 2011).  
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